Abstract. Today, security threats to operating systems largely come from network. Traditional discretionary access control mechanism alone can hardly defeat them. Although traditional mandatory access control models can effectively protect the security of OS, they have problems of being incompatible with application software and complex in administration. In this paper, we propose a new model, Suspicious-Taint-Based Access Control (STBAC) model, for defeating network attacks while being compatible, simple and maintaining good system performance. STBAC regards the processes using Non-Trustable-Communications as the starting points of suspicious taint, traces the activities of the suspiciously tainted processes by taint rules, and forbids the suspiciously tainted processes to illegally access vital resources by protection rules. Even in the cases when some privileged processes are subverted, STBAC can still protect vital resources from being compromised by the intruder. We implemented the model in the Linux kernel and evaluated it through experiments. The evaluation showed that STBAC could protect vital resources effectively without significant impact on compatibility and performance.
Fig.1. STBAC model
We implemented the STBAC model in the Linux kernel, and evaluated its capability of protecting vital resources, compatibility and system performance through experiments.
The paper is organized as follows. We first describe the STBAC model and its four parts in Section 2. In Section 3, the protection capability, compatibility and simplicity of STBAC are analyzed. Section 4 presents the implementation details of the STBAC model in the Linux kernel.
The evaluation results are shown in Section 5. In Section 6, STBAC is compared with related works. Finally, we draw the conclusion in Section 7.
Model Description
The STBAC model consists of four parts: Taint, Health, Vital and Protection, as shown in Figure 1 , where each part is enclosed in a dashed circle. The rectangles indicate processes; the ellipses indicate files or directories; the diamonds indicate sockets; and the balls indicate any entities in OS, such as files, directories, sockets and processes.
The Taint part, probably controlled by an intruder, consists of suspiciously tainted subjects (S t ), suspiciously tainted objects (O t ) and taint rules (TR). TR is categorized into TR sock-proc , TR proc-proc , TR proc-exe and TR exe-proc , and any S t or O t in Figure 1 has a solid dot on its upper left. The Vital part represents the vital resources that should be protected properly. It consists of vital objects that include O conf , O inte and O avai , and vital rules (VR) that include VR proc-proc , VR dir-dir , VR proc-file and VR file-proc . Any vital object in Figure 1 has a hollow dot on its upper left. The Protection part consists of three protection rules (PR): PR conf , PR inte and PR avai , which forbids S t to illegally access vital objects. The Health part consists of health objects (O h ) and health subjects (S h ) that are not tainted or labeled as vital ones. We elaborate on the four parts of STBAC in the following sections.
Taint
As the intruder probably controls the S t and O t , STBAC labels them with suspiciously tainted flag (F t ), and traces S t 's activities in OS kernel with taint rules.
Taint Entities
First of all, we define remote network communications with necessary security means as Trustable-Communications, e.g., the secure shell, and those without security means as Non-Trustable-Communications. Security means include authentication, confidentiality protection, integrity protection, and etc.
Suspiciously Tainted Subject (S t ) is a subject that may be controlled by an intruder and may act for intrusion purposes.
S t is a process in general. For example, it can be a process using Non-Trustable-Communications, or a process of an executable file created by an intruder, or a process of an executable file downloaded from network, or the descendant process of the above processes. It can also be a process that communicates with the above processes, or a descendant of such a process.
Suspiciously Tainted Object (O t )
is an object that is created or modified by an intruder, and may aid in the intrusion.
Generally, O t means either the executable file created and modified by S t , or the process created and accessed by S t , or the file and directory accessed by S t .
Both S t and O t are labeled with Suspiciously Tainted Flag (F t ). 
Taint Rules
Information flows between subjects and objects in OS are significant to OS security research [8] [9] . There have been several studies on the method of backtracking intrusions in kernel based on the dependency graph that depicts information flows [10~13] . With the dependency graph, the administrator can easily trace out all processes and files related to intrusion. STBAC adopts a similar approach to construct taint rules. The information flows that are possible to spread taint are depicted in Table 1 .
If we build taint rules based on Table 1 , the number of tainted processes, files and directories can be very large. The main reason is that S t will taint a vast number of S t s and O t s during its frequent file and directory operations. This may be exploited by the intruder to generate false dependencies [10] , and eventually to aggravate system workload heavily.
Although there are a lot of file and directory operations, most of them cannot spread taint. File and directory operations that can spread taint fall into two types: 1) creating, writing and executing executable files; 2) reading and writing files that may influence process actions. These files are important configuration files or data files. For the second type of operations, we can avoid spreading taint by setting important configuration or data files as integrity protected ones. Thus we can forbid S t to write these files. So, we only need to treat the first type of operations as taint rule instead of the entire set of file and directory operations shown in Table 1 ) depicts that the executable file created or modified by S t should be labeled with F t . Executable files created by S t may be hostile programs, such as programs downloaded from network. On many occasions, modifying or over-writing existing executable files is a way to leave backdoor, for example, using specially modified "ls", "ps" and "netstat" to over-write existing command files. Exe-file to Process Taint Rule ( In order to perfect the confidentiality protection function of STBAC, we further introduce two definitions.
Leak Object (O leak ) is an executable file from which a process derived may leak secrecy while writing files after reading an O conf . Typical examples are "cp", "mcopy", "dd", "passwd", and etc.
Leak Subject (S leak ) is a process derived from O leak that may leak secrecy while writing files after reading an O conf .
Both O leak and S leak are labeled with Leak Flag (F leak ). 
Vital Rules

Health
The Health part consists of health objects (O h ) and health subjects (S h ). A Health Subject (S h ) is a process that has not been tainted or labeled as vital. A Health Object (O h ) is an object that has not been tainted or labeled as vital. The Health can access the Taint and the Vital, and vice versa.
Protection
Corresponding to the three security protection targets, confidentiality, integrity and availability, STBAC sets up three protection rules， which constitute the Protection part.
Confidentiality Protection Rule (
) forbids S t to read O conf , i.e. it forbids suspiciously tainted subjects to read sensitive files, to read or search sensitive directories, and to execute some privileged operations to destroy confidentiality, such as the "ptrace" system call. This indirect leakage requires the participation of S h , and it will not occur without S h . In other words, it is difficult to leak secrecy only under remote user's attack and without local user's cooperation or misuse. The reason lies in that S t cannot control S h and shake off the tracing of taint rules simultaneously. Sometimes, S t wants to control a S h . By the operations of creating processes or executing files, or by IPC communications, S t may succeed in controlling a S h . However, according to the taint rules, these operations are bound to taint the S h .
Integrity Protection Rule (
In a system that users have a sense of security, the indirect leakage of sensitive information won't happen. Nevertheless, we present three ways to prevent leaking sensitive information via user's carelessness.  Relay-spread. After a S h reads O conf , F conf is spread to S h . While S h further writes to an N-O conf file, F conf will be relay-spread to the file. Thus, by PR conf , S t cannot read information from the file any more. From these figures, we can easily find that all three strategies can effectively cut off leaking paths. For relay-spread, there can be the problem of false leakage of sensitive information, i.e. after reading O conf , the writing operation may not necessarily write sensitive information to N-O conf . False leakage of sensitive information will bring rapidly many O conf s into the system, however. As S t cannot read O conf s, S t 's behavior will be restricted so that S t cannot run normally.
For forbid-writing, as it forbids writing from S h to N-O conf , we can rationally consider that S h with F conf has higher sensitive level than N-O conf . This strategy is similar to the usual BLP model enforcement [15] [16] . Certainly, forbid-writing can avoid the problem of false leakage of sensitive information, but to some extent this may also restrict S h 's behavior so that S h cannot run normally.
For selective-spread, it always permits writing to N-O conf , no matter whether it causes spreading F conf to N-O conf or not, hence it does not disturb S h 's running. At the same time, it still can prevent leaking secrecy via spreading F conf to N-O conf when the writing may cause secrecy leakage. So the selective-spread approach is chosen in our model.
The selective-spread strategy can be implemented using F leak , VR proc-file and VR file-proc that are described in Section 2. For instance, copying passwd file from /etc to /tmp can cause leaking secrecy. After executing the cp command file that is labeled with F leak in advance, the process will inherit F leak from the cp file according to VR file-proc ; when the process reads the passwd file labeled with F conf , F conf will be spread to the process by VR file-proc ; when the process subsequently creates a new file /tmp/passwd, F conf will be further spread to the new file, thus the secrecy information in the new file will undoubtedly be protected. However, using the same cp command won't spread F conf if user copies an N-O conf file to anywhere. Only if a process has both F conf and F leak can it spread F conf .
In summary, STBAC can prevent directly and indirectly leaking secrecy based on PR conf and selective-spread mechanism, so it can protect confidentiality well.
Integrity
According to the PR inte and taint rules, STBAC can meet the three conditions of the "Low-Water Mark Policy for Objects" in Biba's model [6] , which are:
(1) Any subject (S) can read any object (O), regardless of their integrity levels (i). After reading, there will be i(s) = min(i(s), i(o)).
(2) s∈S can write o∈O at any integrity level. After writing, there will be i(o) = min(i(s),i(o)); (3) s1∈S can execute s2∈S, only if i(s2)≤i(s1).
By PR inte , we can reasonably confirm that i(S t )=i(O t )<i(O inte )=i(S h )=i(O h ). So the first condition can be satisfied by taint rules of TR sock-proc , TR proc-proc and TR exe-proc . The second condition can only be satisfied partially by the taint rule of TR proc-exe , because, after a S t write to a O h , STBAC will not downgrade i(O h ) when the O h is not an executable file, this does not comply with the second condition. However, this will not be exploited by intruder for that PR inte can protect important executable files, configuration files and data files from being written by S t . The third condition requires that low integrity level subject cannot execute high integrity level object, i.e. S t cannot get a S h if i(S t )<i(S h ). In detail, according to TR proc-proc and TR exe-proc , though S t can get a process by operations of creating processes or executing files, the process gotten by S t surely is labeled with F t . Thus the process gotten by S t is also a S t , but not a S h . So, the third condition is met.
In summary, STBAC basically satisfies the "Low-Water Mark Policy for Objects", so that it can prevent integrity damage caused by intruder.
Availability
Availability protection is to prevent illegal blocking of accessing data or services [14] . The action tampering availability has been concluded as DOS [17] . STBAC can protect availability in two manners:
First, from the perspective of OS, availability has to be built on the basis of integrity. Hence, STBAC protects firstly integrity of data, service configurations and system configurations by PR inte .
Second, STBAC restricts allocation of resources by two HWMs, i.e. HWM St and HWM SYS . HWM St restricts the amount of resources allocated to each S t . HWM SYS forbids allocating new resources to S t when idle resources in the system is very few.
However, availability protection still requires that the system can tolerate or recover from internal errors, external attacks, and even physical failures. Due to the shortage of access control mechanism, these requirements have to be met by error-recovery [18] or self-healing [19] mechanisms.
Compatibility Analysis
STBAC does not influence the actions of local users and remote users using Trustable-Communications. It also does not affect most actions of S t , because STBAC only forbids S t to illegally access vital resources, which are merely a small part of all the resources, and does not forbid S t to legally access vital resources, such as reading and executing O inte . Shared-O inte is usually a system configuration file that has to be modified by a process using In summary, STBAC can get good compatibility because it only prevents S t from illegally accessing vital resources.
Though we have incompatibility problems from Shared-O conf and Shared-O inte , the amounts of these objects are tiny, and they can be resolved by the Trustable-Communication-List and Partial-Copy mechanisms.
Simplicity Analysis
Simplicity of STBAC derives from the fact that it is simple to administer and easy to understand. The main work for administering STBAC is to identify those files or directories that need to be protected and set vital flags. This is straightforward and easy to understand. As the system files and directories that need protection could be set vital flags automatically by the system, the user only needs to set his/her data files and directories. Taint flag can be generated and spread automatically by the kernel, and does not need any manual operations. Partial-Copy and Trustable-Communication-List may bring some additional work, but the work is limited because of the very small amount of Shared-O conf and Shared-O inte .
Model Implementation
We have implemented a STBAC prototype in the Linux kernel Similar to the methodology of M.
Abrams et al. [23] , we divide the implementation into three parts: enforcement, decision and information. Separating model enforcement from model decision has the advantage of conveniently modifying and adding model rules without change of most codes, as described in [24] . The information part is not independent of the kernel, but is founded on modifying existing kernel structure.
The enforcement part intercepts accesses at related system calls or important kernel functions, and issues requests to the decision part. For the protection requests, such as confidentiality protection requests, integrity protection requests or availability protection requests, the enforcement part permits or denies the access according to the result returned by the decision part. For the spread requests, such as taint spread requests and vital flag spread requests, the enforcement part does nothing after posting the requests, and the decision part directly modifies data structures of the information part. Table 2 describes the modified system calls and kernel functions, and the corresponding model rules. The main advantage of the former one is that it is independent of Linux kernel codes, but the disadvantage is that it will lose performance significantly; the latter one can use kernel functions to organize and maintain data structures so that it is easy to be implemented and has little performance reduction. The latter one is adopted.
In addition, we created four commands: stbac_set_flag, stbac_get_flag, stbac_admin_trusted_comm and stbac_admin_partial_copy. The stbac_set_flag and stbac_get_flag are used to set and get all kinds of STBAC flags. They can operate on all files and directories under a directory at a time, or operate on all descendants of a process at a time. We also created a shell script named "stbac_init" to automatically initiate and check the STBAC flags for system directories and files when booting the system.
All partial copies are saved under "./stbac". The password and user management commands are modified to synchronize Shared-O inte with its partial copy automatically.
Model Evaluation
In order to evaluate the STBAC model, we tested the STBAC prototype system from three aspects: protection capability, compatibility and performance. We prepared two Linux machines using RedHat 9.0 whose kernel was 2. 
Protection Test
Three tests were designed, "remote-user", "web-downloaded-program" and "remote-attack", to verify if STBAC can forbid the remote users who logged in by Non-Trustable-Communications, web-downloaded programs and intruders to illegally access vital resources.
For the convenience of analyzing the test result, the printk() function is called in STBAC-enforced kernel to log every step of intrusion. Function printk() is located in the STBAC decision part, and has the calling form of printk("<4>subject, object, operation, parameter, result"). After every test, we analyzed the logs and drew the dependency graph with the same notations as that in Figure 1 .
remote-user
First, a user who logged in as root identity from local created a new file of new_command under /sbin directory, and copied the passwd file to /tmp directory. Then, a user logged in from remote, changed identity to root by su command, tried to modify the new_command file's access right bits, and tried to read the /tmp/passwd file. The test result is shown in Figure 4 . The vi process launched by local user's bash is a health subject. It creates a new file /sbin/new_command which inherits F inte flag from parent directory /sbin by VR dir-dir rule. The cp process is also launched by local user's bash, inherits F leak flag from the cp file when executing the cp file by VR file-proc rule It inherits F conf flag from /etc/passwd when reading /etc/passwd by VR file-proc rule, and spreads F conf flag to /tmp/passwd when creating /tmp/passwd by VR proc-file rule.
The remote user's vi process inherits F t flag by TR sock-proc and TR proc-proc rules, then it is refused by PR conf rule when it tries to read /tmp/passwd file. The remote user's chmod process also inherits F t flag by TR sock-proc and TR proc-proc rules, it is refused by PR inte rule when it tries to modify the attribute of the /sbin/new_command file.
So, vital rules can automatically spread vital flags to vital objects and subjects; taint rules can automatically trace remote user's activities in kernel; and protection rules of PR conf and PR inte can forbid remote users to get secrecy or to change integrity information. That is, even if a remote user has gotten root identity through some ways, i.e., Non-Trustable-Communications, his/her illegal activities are still prevented by protection rules.
web-downloaded-program
We designed two little programs for downloading. One program named consume-cpu consumes cpu time by an infinite loop; the other program named consume-mem uses up memory by non-stop memory allocation. These two programs were put on the attacker machine and could be downloaded from the web. Figure 5 shows the test result.
As Mozilla process is a S t , consume-cpu and consume-mem downloaded by a local user are both O t by TR proc-exe rule.
When a user runs consume-cpu program, the new process of consume-cpu becomes S t by TR exe-proc rule. When the time exceeds, the process will be stopped by PR avai rule. When the user runs consume-mem, the new process of consume-mem becomes S t by TR exe-proc rule. After excessive memory has been allocated, subsequent allocation operations of consume-mem are refused by PR avai rule.
So, taint rules can trace activities of web-downloaded programs in kernel, and PR avai rule can prevent web-downloaded programs from occupying excessive resources.
remote-attack
This test uses real attack tools to attack the victim machine from the attacker machine. It takes seven steps: 1) Attack samba to get root shell; 2) Kill syslogd process to stop system log service; 3) Get user's important files to gain user's Samba's version is 2.2.8 and it suffers buffer overflow vulnerability by which the intruder can get root shell. Knark is a famous root-kit whose idea derives from [25] , and it will add a kernel module to Linux. Att-samba is an experimental attack tool that is modified from a network-downloaded program. /home/szy/data is an important data file that the intruder wants to get.
The attack progress is shown in Figure 6 As is shown above, attack steps of 2 to 6 all failed. Since these five steps are critical to the intrusion, we can say that STBAC has defeated the intrusion. During this, STBAC uses TR sock-proc , TR proc-proc and TR proc-exe to trace activities of the intruder in kernel, and uses PR conf and PR inte to prevent the intruder who has gotten root identity to gain secrecy, to modify files and to leave backdoors.
These three tests validated all of the taint rules, vital rules and protection rules. By taint rules STBAC can trace activities of remote users, web-downloaded programs and intruders in the OS kernel. By vital rules STBAC can spread vital flags to subjects and objects which need protection. Based on spreading taint flags and vital flags, protection rules can prevent invalid actions of S t , thus protecting confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Compatibility Test
On the STBAC-enforced Linux kernel 2.4.20-8, we have run many network applications and local applications without 
Non-S t Environment
In this test, we applied the "kernel compile" [29] testing approach. The "kernel compile" is a broadly accepted method for testing the general performance of Linux. The test uses "victim" as the test machine, and uses the default configuration for kernel compiling. The victim is a 1.1GHz Intel Celeron machine with 256M sized main memory, and 100MHz DRAM clock. [29] and [28] , we recorded the User-time and System-time as well as the Real-time.
As the model is implemented in kernel and the Real-time is easily influenced by random environment factors, we focus on the System-time instead of the Real-time. In Table 4 , the System-time of the STBAC-enforced kernel increased 1.7% compared with that of the non-STBAC kernel. The comparison test was run three times. Similar results were obtained. The first run of the test was done with "cold-cache" while the other two were in "warm-cache". So the Real-time in the first run was more than that of the other two, since the first compiling has to read a great deal of files from disk while the last two compilings can read many files from memory or disk swapping area.
S t -existing Environment
As S t comes from network communication, we designed two UDP communication programs for this test. One was installed on the victim machine as a client; the other was installed on the attacker machine as a server. The client sent UDP request package to the server. After receiving the answer package from the server, the client resent the same UDP package to the server. It repeated sending 100,000 packages to the server and receiving 100,000 packages from the server.
Network application Local application
Network services Due to this dynamic characteristic of STBAC, administration work is dramatically decreased. Users do not need to predefine which subject is S h or S t , and which object is O h or O t . These definitions are automatically done by the taint rules during system execution.
Intrusion Backtracking in OS
Another related work is the intrusion backtracking in OS. In 2003, S.T.King and P.M.Chen built an effective intrusion backtracking and analyzing tool named Backtracker [13] [10]. It can help administrators to find intrusion steps with the help of the dependency graph that is generated by logging and analyzing OS events. Zhu and Chiueh built a repairable file service named RFS [11] , which supports kernel logging to allow roll-back of any file update operation, and keeps track of inter-process dependencies to quickly determine the extent of system damage after an attack/error. In 2005, Ashvin Goel and Kenneth Po built an intrusion recovery system named taser [12] , which helps in selectively recovering file-system data after an attack. It determines the set of tainted file-system objects by creating dependencies among sockets, processes and files based on the entries in the system audit log. These works all focus on the intrusion analysis and recovery by logging system activities, and directly inspired the taint rules of STBAC. The most distinctive point in our work is that our objective is to build an access control mechanism that can trace and block intrusions in real time.
Tainted Data Analysis
The third related work is tainted data analysis. In 2005, James Newsome and Dawn Song built a detection tool named TaintCheck [26] , which performs dynamic taint analysis on a program by running the program in its own emulation environment. In 2006, Alex Ho and Michael Fetterman et al. built a taint-based protection system [27] that traces tainted data in a Virtual-Machine-and-hardware-emulation-combined environment. STBAC differs from these two works in the following ways: (1) the meaning of the taint is different. Taint in STBAC isn't tainted data, but tainted OS objects or subjects, such as tainted processes or tainted files; (2) the method of tracing taint is different. STBAC traces taint on the basis of the operations between OS-level subjects and objects, for example processes reading files or sockets. But these two works are both based on hardware-level instructions, such as LOAD, STORE and MOVE; (3) the objective is different. STBAC tries to prevent illegal actions of tainted subjects, while these two works try to detect intrusions.
Information-Flow-Based Access Control
Asbestos [31] and HiStar [20] are both information-flow-based access control. They label data with its owner, track information as it moves around in OS, and base access control decision on the labels. Our work differs from Asbestos' in two points. First, Asbestos aims to isolate users from each other, thus to prevent illegal access to user data; STBAC exploits DAC to isolate users and uses mandatory protection rules to forbid S t to illegally access vital resources which contain not only user data but also important system files, directories and privileges. Second, Asbestos uses user-related labels to trace data flow. This has to use "event process" and "label", which increase complexity and consume excessive resources. STBAC uses simple flags and taint rules to trace S t 's activities, so the implementation is simple and impact to performance is kept at a minimum.
Linux Security Enhancement
There are several famous Linux security enhancement projects, such as SELinux [22] , LIDS [4] , DTE [28] , systrace [21] , LOMAC [2] [3], and etc. SELinux is a powerful Linux security enhancement project. It can flexibly support multiple security policies. But for general users, it is difficult to bring into play, because it requires professional knowledge on the part of the user. LOMAC has similar ideas with ours. It implements the Low-Water-Mark model [6] in Linux kernel, and aims to bring simple but useful MAC integrity protection to Linux. It maintains good compatibility with existing software. But LOMAC does not consider safeguarding confidentiality and usability.
If having interest, please also read our other papers [32] - [71] .
Conclusions
In work of STBAC is to set vital flags for user files and directories that need to be protected, which is straightforward and easy to understand. The vital flags of system files and directories can be automatically labeled by a shell script "stbac_init" when booting the system. F t is automatically generated and propagated by kernel and does not require any manual operation. For performance, tests in both non-S t environment and S t -existing environment showed that there is merely 1.7%~4.6% performance reduction caused by STBAC.
Therefore, the STBAC model is useful in OS to defeat network attacks while maintaining good compatibility, simplicity and system performance.
